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German Army
Deutsches Heer
Helmet decal used by the German Army in the mid-1940s
Founded	1935; 89 years ago (1935)
Disbanded	August 1946; 78 years ago (1946-08)
Country	Germany
Allegiance	Adolf Hitler
Type	Army
Size	Total served: 13,600,000
Part of	Wehrmacht
Headquarters	Maybach I, Wünsdorf
Equipment	List of army equipment
Engagements	Spanish Civil War (1936–1939) World War II (1939–1945)
Commanders
Commander-in-chief	Adolf Hitler
Commander-in-chief of the Army	See list
Chief of the General Staff	See list
Insignia
Unit flag

The German Army (German: Heer, German: [heːɐ̯] ; lit. 'army') was the land forces component of the Wehrmacht, the regular armed forces of Nazi Germany, from 1935 until it effectively ceased to exist in 1945 and then was formally dissolved in August 1946. During World War II, a total of about 13.6 million volunteers and conscripts served in the German Army.

Only 17 months after Adolf Hitler announced the German rearmament programme in 1935, the army reached its projected goal of 36 divisions. During the autumn of 1937, two more corps were formed. In 1938 four additional corps were formed with the inclusion of the five divisions of the Austrian Army after the annexation of Austria by Germany in March. During the period of its expansion under Hitler, the German Army continued to develop concepts pioneered during World War I, combining ground and air units into combined arms forces. Coupled with operational and tactical methods such as encirclements and "battle of annihilation", the German military managed quick victories in the two initial years of World War II, a new style of warfare described as Blitzkrieg (lightning war) for its speed and destructive power.

Structure

The Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) was Nazi Germany's Army High Command from 1936 to 1945. In theory, the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) served as the military general staff for the Reich's armed forces, co-ordinating the Wehrmacht's (Heer, Kriegsmarine, Luftwaffe, and the Waffen-SS) operations. In practice, the OKW acted in a subordinate role to Hitler's personal military staff, translating his ideas into military plans and orders, and issuing them to the three services. However, as World War II went on, the OKW found itself exercising an increasing amount of direct command authority over military units, particularly in the west. This meant that by 1942, the authority of the Army High Command (OKH) was limited to the Eastern Front.

The Abwehr was the army intelligence organisation from 1921 to 1944. The term Abwehr (German for "defence", here referring to counterintelligence) had been created just after World War I as an ostensible concession to Allied demands that Germany's intelligence activities be for defensive purposes only. After 4 February 1938, the name Abwehr was changed to the Overseas Department/Office in Defence of the Armed Forces High Command (Amt Ausland/Abwehr im Oberkommando der Wehrmacht).

Germany used a system of military districts (German: Wehrkreis) in order to relieve field commanders of as much administrative work as possible and to provide a regular flow of trained recruits and supplies to the field forces. The method the OKW adopted was to separate the Field Army (OKH) from the Home Command (Heimatkriegsgebiet) and to entrust the responsibilities of training, conscription, supply, and equipment to Home Command.

Organisation of field forces

The German Army was mainly structured in army groups (Heeresgruppen) consisting of several armies that were relocated, restructured, or renamed in the course of the war. Forces of allied states, as well as units made up of non-Germans, were also assigned to German units.

For Operation Barbarossa in 1941, the army forces were assigned to three strategic campaign groupings:

• Army Group North with Leningrad as its campaign objective
• Army Group Centre with Smolensk as its campaign objective
• Army Group South with Kiev as its campaign objective

Below the army group level forces included field armies – panzer groups, which later became army level formations themselves, corps, and divisions. The army used the German term Kampfgruppe, which equates to battle group in English. These provisional combat groupings ranged from corps size, such as Army Detachment Kempf, to commands composed of companies or even platoons. They were named for their commanding officers.

Select arms of service

• Afrika Korps (Africa Corps)
• Feldgendarmerie (Field Military Police)
• Feldjägerkorps (Field Police Corps)
• Gebirgsjäger (Mountain Troops)
• Geheime Feldpolizei (Secret Field Police)
• Ostlegionen (Eastern Legions)
• Panzergrenadier (Mechanized Infantry)
• Panzerjäger (Anti-Tank Troops)
• Panzerwaffe (Armoured Forces)
• Nachrichtentruppe (Signal Corps)
• Sicherungs-Divisionen (Security Divisions)

Doctrine and tactics

The German operational doctrine emphasized sweeping pincer and lateral movements meant to destroy the enemy forces as quickly as possible. This approach, referred to as Blitzkrieg, was an operational doctrine instrumental in the success of the offensives in Poland and France. Blitzkrieg has been considered by many historians as having its roots in precepts developed by Fuller, Liddel-Hart, and Hans von Seeckt, and even having ancient prototypes practised by Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, and Napoleon. Recent studies of the Battle of France also suggest that the actions of either Erwin Rommel or Heinz Guderian or both of them (both had contributed to the theoretical development and early practices of what later became Blitzkrieg prior to World War II), ignoring orders of superiors who had never foreseen such spectacular successes and thus prepared much more prudent plans, were conflated into a purposeful doctrine and created the first archetype of Blitzkrieg, which then gained a fearsome reputation that dominated the Allied leaders' minds. Thus 'Blitzkrieg' was recognised after the fact, and while it became adopted by the Wehrmacht, it never became the official doctrine nor got used to its full potential because only a small part of the Wehrmacht was trained for it and key leaders at the highest levels either focused on only certain aspects or even did not understand it.

Max Visser argues that the German Army focused on achieving high combat performance rather than high organisational efficiency (like the US Army). It emphasised adaptability, flexibility, and decentralised decision making. Officers and NCOs were selected based on character and trained towards decisive combat leadership. Good combat performance was rewarded. Visser argues this allowed the German Army to achieve superior combat performance compared to a more traditional organisational doctrine like the American one; while this was ultimately offset by the Allies' superior numerical and materiel advantage, Visser argues that it allowed the German Army to resist far longer than if it had not adopted this method of organisation and doctrine. Peter Turchin reports a study by US colonel Trevor Dupuy that found that German combat efficiency was higher than both the British and US armies – if a combat efficiency of 1 was assigned to the British, then the Americans had a combat efficiency of 1.1 and the Germans of 1.45. This would mean British forces would need to commit 45% more troops (or arm existing troops more heavily to the same proportion) to have an even chance of winning the battle, while the Americans would need to commit 30% more to have an even chance.

Tactics

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The military strength of the German Army was managed through mission-based tactics (Auftragstaktik) rather than detailed order-based tactics, and rigid discipline. Once an operation began, whether offensive or defensive, speed of response to changing circumstances was considered more important than careful planning and co-ordination of new plans.

In public opinion, the German military was and is sometimes seen as a high-tech army, since new technologies that were introduced before and during World War II influenced its development of tactical doctrine. These technologies were featured by Nazi propaganda, but were often only available in small numbers or late in the war, as overall supplies of raw materials and armaments became low. For example, lacking sufficient motor vehicles to equip more than a small portion of their army, the Germans chose to concentrate the available vehicles in a small number of divisions which were to be fully motorised. The other divisions continued to rely on horses for towing artillery, other heavy equipment, and supply wagons, and the men marched on foot or rode bicycles. At the height of motorisation only 20 per cent of all units were fully motorised. The small German contingent fighting in North Africa was fully motorised (relying on horses in the desert was near to impossible because of the need to carry large quantities of water and fodder), but the much larger force invading the Soviet Union in June 1941 numbered only some 150,000 trucks and some 625,000 horses (water was abundant and for many months of the year horses could forage, reducing the burden on the supply chain). However, the production of new motor vehicles by Germany, even with the exploitation of the industries of occupied countries, could not keep up with the heavy loss of motor vehicles during the winter of 1941–1942. From June 1941 to the end of February 1942 German forces in the Soviet Union lost some 75,000 trucks, approximately half the number they had at the beginning of the campaign, to mechanical wear and tear and combat damage. Most of these were lost during the retreat in the face of the Soviet counteroffensive from December 1941 to February 1942. Another substantial loss was incurred during the defeat of the German 6th Army at Stalingrad in the winter of 1942–1943. These losses in men and materiel led to motorised troops making up no more than 10% of total Heer forces at some points of the war.

In offensive operations the infantry formations were used to attack more or less simultaneously across a large portion of the front so as to pin the enemy forces ahead of them and draw attention to themselves, while the mobile formations were concentrated to attack only narrow sectors of the front, breaking through to the enemy rear and surrounding him. Some infantry formations followed in the path of the mobile formations, mopping-up, widening the corridor manufactured by the breakthrough attack and solidifying the ring surrounding the enemy formations left behind, and then gradually destroying them in concentric attacks. One of the most significant problems bedeviling German offensives and initially alarming senior commanders was the gap created between the fast-moving "fast formations" and the following infantry, as the infantry were considered a prerequisite for protecting the fast formations' flanks and rear and enabling supply columns carrying fuel, petrol, and ammunition to reach them.

In defensive operations the infantry formations were deployed across the front to hold the main defense line and the mobile formations were concentrated in a small number of locations from where they launched focused counterattacks against enemy forces which had broken through the infantry defense belt. In autumn 1942, at El Alamein, a lack of fuel compelled the German commander, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, to scatter his armoured units across the front in battalion-sized concentrations to reduce travel distances to each sector, rather than hold them concentrated in one location. In 1944 Rommel argued that in the face of overwhelming Allied air power the tactic of employing the concentrated "fast formations" was no longer possible to defend against the expected Allied invasion of France, because they could no longer move quickly enough to reach the threatened locations due to the expected interdiction of all routes by Allied fighter-bombers. He therefore suggested scattering these units across the front just behind the infantry. His commanders and peers, who were less experienced in the effect of Allied air power, disagreed vehemently with his suggestion, arguing that this would violate the prime principle of concentration of force.

Campaigns

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The infantry remained foot soldiers throughout the war, and artillery remained primarily horse-drawn. The motorized formations received much attention in the world press in the opening years of the war, and were cited as the main reason for the success of the German invasions of Poland (September 1939), Denmark and Norway (1940), Belgium, France, and the Netherlands (May 1940), Yugoslavia (April 1941), and the initial stages of Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union (June 1941). However, their motorised and tank formations accounted for only 20% of the Heer's capacity at their peak strength. The army's lack of trucks and fuel to run them severely limited infantry movement, especially during and after the Normandy invasion when Allied air power devastated the French rail network north of the Loire. Panzer movements also depended on rail, since driving a tank long distances caused serious wear.

Personnel

Equipment

Contrary to popular belief, the German Army in World War II was not a mechanised juggernaut as a whole. In 1941, between 60 and 70 percent of their forces were not motorised, relying on railroad for rapid movement and on horse-drawn transport cross country. The percentage of motorisation decreased thereafter. In 1944 approximately 85 percent of the Army was not motorised. The standard uniform used by the German Army consisted of a Feldgrau (field grey) tunic and trousers, worn with a Stahlhelm.

War crimes

Nazi propaganda had told German soldiers to wipe out what were variously called Jewish Bolshevik subhumans, the Mongol hordes, the Asiatic flood, and the red beast. While the principal perpetrators of the killings of civilians behind the front lines amongst German armed forces were the Nazi German "political" armies (the SS-Totenkopfverbände, the Waffen-SS, and the Einsatzgruppen), the army committed and ordered war crimes of its own (e.g. the Commissar Order), particularly during the invasion of Poland and later in the war against the Soviet Union.

Propaganda

The German Army was extensively promoted by Nazi propaganda.

See also

• Army Personnel Office (Wehrmacht)
• Bribery of senior Wehrmacht officers
• General der Nachrichtenaufklärung
• Glossary of German military terms
• Military production during World War II
• Ranks and insignia of the German Army (1935–1945)
• Waffenamt
• War crimes of the Wehrmacht

Notes

1. The official dissolution of the Wehrmacht began with the German Instrument of Surrender of 8 May 1945. Reasserted in Proclamation No. 2 of the Allied Control Council on 20 September 1945, the dissolution was officially declared by ACC Law No. 34 of 20 August 1946.
2. Though "Wehrmacht" is often erroneously used to refer only to the Army, it also included the Kriegsmarine (Navy) and the Luftwaffe (Air Force).

References

1. Allied Control Authority 1946a, p. 81.
2. Allied Control Authority 1946b, p. 63.
3. Overmans 2000, p. 257.
4. Large 1996, p. 25.
5. Haskew 2011, p. 28.
6. Haskew 2011, pp. 61–62.
7. Haskew 2011, pp. 40–41.
8. Harrison 2002, p. 133.
9. Rice 2005, pp. 9, 11.
10. Paniccia 2014, p. ?.
11. Grossman 1993, p. 3.
12. Lonsdale 2007, p. ?.
13. Showalter 2006, p. ?.
14. Krause & Phillips 2006, p. 176.
15. Stroud 2013, pp. 33–34.
16. Caddick-Adams 2015, p. 17.
17. Vigor 1983, p. 96.
18. Zabecki 1999, p. 1175.
19. Visser, Max. "Configurations of human resource practices and battlefield performance: A comparison of two armies." Human Resource Management Review 20, no. 4 (2010): 340–349.
20. Turchin, P., 2007. War and peace and war: The rise and fall of empires. Penguin, pp.257–258
21. Balsamo, Larry T. (1991). "Germany's Armed Forces in the Second World War: Manpower, Armaments, and Supply". The History Teacher. 24 (3): 263–277. doi:10.2307/494616. ISSN 0018-2745. JSTOR 494616.
22. Keegan 1982, pp. 156–157.
23. Zeiler & DuBois 2012, pp. 171–172.
24. Tucker 2009, p. 1885.
25. Evans 1989, pp. 58–60.
26. Böhler 2006, pp. 183–184, 189, 241.
27. "ueber Allem Steht Die Deutshe Infantrie (Above All Comes the German Infantry)". digitalcollections.hclib.org. Retrieved 2023-08-31.

Bibliography

• Allied Control Authority (1946a). "Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Co-ordinating Committee" (PDF). I. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
• Allied Control Authority (1946b). "Enactments and Approved Papers of the Control Council and Co-ordinating Committee" (PDF). IV. {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
• Böhler, Jochen (2006). Auftakt zum Vernichtungskrieg. Die Wehrmacht in Polen 1939 (in German). Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag. ISBN 978-3-596-16307-6.
• Caddick-Adams, Peter (2015). Snow & Steel: The Battle of the Bulge, 1944–45. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199335145.
• CIA (24 August 1999). "Records Integration Title Book" (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on January 23, 2017. Retrieved 11 December 2018.
• Evans, Richard J. (1989). In Hitler's Shadow West German Historians and the Attempt to Escape the Nazi Past. New York: Pantheon. ISBN 978-0-394-57686-2.
• Grossman, David A. (1993). Maneuver Warfare in the Light Infantry-The Rommel Model (PDF). Archived from the original (PDF) on 2016-11-18. Retrieved 2016-07-13.
• Harrison, Gordon A. (2002). The Cross Channel Attack (Publication 7-4). Archived from the original on 2014-02-26. Retrieved 2016-07-09.
• Haskew, Michael (2011). The Wehrmacht: 1935–1945. Amber Books Ltd. ISBN 978-1-907446-95-5.
• Keegan, John (1982). Six Armies in Normandy. Viking Press. ISBN 978-0670647361.
• Krause, Michael D.; Phillips, R. Cody (2006). Historical Perspectives of the Operational Art. Government Printing Office. ISBN 9780160725647.
• Large, David Clay (1996). Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era. The University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 978-0807845394.
• Lonsdale, David J. (Dec 10, 2007). Alexander the Great: Lessons in Strategy. Routledge. ISBN 9781134244829.
• Overmans, Rüdiger (2000). Deutsche militärische Verluste im Zweiten Weltkrieg (in German). De Gruyter Oldenbourg. ISBN 3-486-56531-1.
• Paniccia, Arduino (Jan 14, 2014). Reshaping the Future: Handbook for a new Strategy. Mazzanti Libri - Me Publisher. ISBN 9788898109180.
• Rice, Earle Jr. (2005). Blitzkrieg! Hitler's Lightning War. Mitchell Lane Publishers, Inc. ISBN 9781612286976.
• Shepherd, Ben (2016). Hitler's Soldiers: The German Army in the Third Reich. Yale University Press. ISBN 9780300179033.
• Showalter, Dennis (Jan 3, 2006). Patton And Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century. Penguin. ISBN 9781440684685.
• Stroud, Rick (2013). The Phantom Army of Alamein: The Men Who Hoodwinked Rommel. A&C Black. ISBN 9781408831281.
• Tucker, Spencer C. (2009). A Global Chronology of Conflict: From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East: From the Ancient World to the Modern Middle East. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 978-1-85109-672-5.
• Vigor, P.H. (1983). Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory. Springer. ISBN 9781349048144.
• Zabecki, David T. (1999). World War Two in Europe. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 9780824070298.
• Zeiler, Thomas W.; DuBois, Daniel M. (2012). A Companion to World War II. John Wiley & Sons. ISBN 978-1-118-32504-9.

External links

• The Nazi German Army 1935–1945 (Heer)
• "The Role of the German Army during the Holocaust: A Brief Summary.": Video on YouTube—lecture by Geoffrey P. Megargee, via the official channel of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

Structure of the German Army

v t e Army Groups of the German Army (1935–1945) A B C D E F G H (Northwest) Africa Centre Courland Don North Ostmark South Upper Rhine North Ukraine South Ukraine Vistula v t e Armies of the German Army in World War II Armies Numbered 1 – 9 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 – 19 10 11 12 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 – 25 20 (Mountain) 21 24 25 Named Liguria Norway East Prussia Army Detachment Kempf Steiner Panzer 1 2 3 4 5 6 11 (SS) Africa Parachute 1 v t e German Army corps (1934–1945) Army Armeekorps I – IX I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX X – XIX X XI XII XIII XIV XV XVI XVII XVIII XIX XX – XXIX XX XXI XXII XXIII XXIV XXV XXVI XXVII XXVIII XXIX XXX – XXXIX XXX XXXI XXXII XXXIII XXXIV XXXV XXXVIII XXXIX XXXX – XXXXVIII XXXX XXXXI XXXXII XXXXIII XXXXIV XXXXVI XXXXVII XXXXVIII L – LIX L LI LII LIII LIV LV LVII LIX LXII – LXIX LXII LXIII LXIV LXV LXVI LXVII LXVIII LXIX LXX – LXXVIII LXX LXXI LXXII LXXIII LXXIV LXXV LXXVI LXXVIII LXXX – LXXXIX LXXX LXXXI LXXXII LXXXIII LXXXIV LXXXV LXXXVI LXXXVII LXXXVIII LXXXIX LXXXX – CI LXXXX LXXXXI LXXXXVII CI Panzer Panzerkorps I – XXXIX III IV VII XIV XXIV XXXVIII XXXIX XXXX – XXXXVIII XXXX XXXXI XXXXVI XXXXVII XXXXVIII LVI – LXXVI LVI LVII LVIII LXXVI Feldherrnhalle Großdeutschland Mountain Gebirgskorps XV XVIII XIX XXI XXII XXXVI XXXXIX LI Cavalry Kavalleriekorps I Miscellaneous Afrika Korps v t e German Panzer divisions of World War II Army Numbered 1st – 9th 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10th – 19th 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20th – 27th 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 116 Named Clausewitz Feldherrnhalle 1 Feldherrnhalle 2 Holstein Jüterbog Kempf Panzer Lehr Müncheberg Tatra Reserve 155 179 233 273 Waffen-SS 1 Leibstandarte 2 Das Reich 3 Totenkopf 5 Wiking 9 Hohenstaufen 10 Frundsberg 12 Hitlerjugend Luftwaffe 1 Hermann Göring See also: Heavy tank battalion, SS Panzer Division order of battle v t e Infantry divisions of the German Army (1935–1945) Infantry divisions 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th 13th 14th 15th 16th 17th 18th 19th 20th 21st 22nd 23rd 24th 25th 26th 27th 28th 29th 30th 31st 32nd 33rd 34th 35th 36th 38th 39th 41st 44th 45th 46th 47th 48th 49th 50th 52nd 56th 57th 58th 59th 60th 61st 62nd 63rd 64th 65th 68th 69th 70th 71st 72nd 73rd 74th 75th 76th 77th 78th 79th 80th 81st 82nd 83rd 84th 85th 86th 87th 88th 89th 91st 92nd 93rd 94th 95th 96th 98th 102nd 106th 110th 111th 112th 113th 121st 122nd 123rd 125th 126th 129th 131st 132nd 134th 137th 148th 153rd 154th 155th 156th 157th 158th 159th 160th 161st 162nd 162nd (Turk.) 163rd 164th 166th 167th 168th 169th 170th 174th 176th 180th 181st 182nd 183rd 189th 190th 196th 197th 198th 199th 201st 203rd 205th 206th 207th 208th 209th 210th 211th 212th 213th 214th 215th 216th 217th 218th 219th 221st 223rd 225th 226th 227th 228th 230th 231st 232nd 237th 239th 240th 242nd 243rd 244th 245th 246th 249th 250th 251st 252nd 253rd 254th 255th 256th 257th 258th 260th 262nd 263rd 264th 265th 266th 267th 268th 269th 270th 271st 272nd 273rd 274th 275th 276th 277th 278th 279th 280th 281st 282nd 286th 290th 291st 292nd 293rd 294th 295th 296th 297th 298th 299th 301st 302nd 303rd 304th 305th 306th 309th 311th 319th 320th 321st 323rd 324th 325th 326th 327th 328th 329th 330th 331st 332nd 333rd 334th 335th 336th 337th 338th 339th 340th 342nd 343rd 344th 346th 347th 348th 349th 351st 352nd 353rd 355th 356th 357th 358th 359th 361st 362nd 363rd 364th 365th 367th 369th 370th 371st 372nd 373rd 376th 377th 379th 383rd 384th 385th 387th 389th 392nd 393rd 395th 399th 416th 430th 462nd 521st 526th 554th 555th 556th 557th 600th 606th 650th 702nd 703rd 704th 707th 708th 709th 710th 711th 712th 713th 714th 715th 716th 717th 718th 719th Berlin Döberitz Ferdinand v. Schill Friedrich Ludwig Jahn Großdeutschland Güstrow Hamburg Kurland Potsdam Schlageter Seeland Scharnhorst Theodor Körner Ulrich v. Hutten Motorised infantry divisions 2nd 3rd 10th 13th 14th 16th 18th 20th 25th 29th 36th 60th 345th 386th Panzergrenadier divisions 3rd 10th 15th 16th 18th 20th 25th 29th 90th Brandenburg Kurmark Großdeutschland Mountain divisions 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 157th 188th Ski divisions 1st Grenadier divisions 19th 31st 36th 45th 78th 541st 542nd 543rd 544th 545th 546th 547th 548th 549th 550th 551st 552nd 553rd 558th 559th 560th 561st 562nd 563rd 564th Jäger divisions 5th 8th 28th 42nd 97th 100th 101st 104th 114th 117th 118th Light divisions 3rd 5th 8th 28th 90th Africa 97th 99th 100th 101st 164th Africa 999th Africa Security divisions 52nd 201st 203rd 207th 213th 221st 281st 285th 286th 325th 390th 391st 403rd 444th 454th 707th Volksgrenadier divisions 6th 9th 12th 16th 18th 19th 22nd 26th 31st 36th 45th 46th 47th 61st 62nd 78th 79th 98th 167th 183rd 211th 212th 246th 256th 257th 271st 272nd 276th 277th 278th 320th 326th 334th 337th 340th 347th 349th 352nd 361st 363rd 462nd 541st 542nd 544th 545th 547th 548th 549th 551st 553rd 558th 559th 560th 561st 562nd 563rd 564th 565th 566th 567th 568th 569th 570th 571st 572nd 573rd 574th 575th 576th 577th 578th 579th 580th 581st 582nd 583rd 584th 585th 586th 587th 588th 708th Frontier Guard divisions 538th Shadow divisions Böhmen Breslau Demba Dennewitz Donau Döllersheim Dresden Generalgouvernement Grafenwöhr Groß-Born Großgörschen Hannover Jütland Katzbach Mähren Mielau Milowitz Möckern Münsingen Neuhammer Niedergörsdorf Ostpreußen Röhn Schlesien Wahn Wildflecken Field training divisions 52nd 149th 151st 152nd 153rd 154th 155th 156th 158th 381st 382nd 388th 390th Kurland Nord Fortress divisions 41st 133rd Crete Gotenhafen Frankfurt/Oder Stettin Swinemünde Warsaw See also: Aufstellungswelle • List of German divisions in World War II v t e German Field Marshals and Grand Admirals of Nazi Germany Marshal of the Reich (Reichsmarschall) Wehrmacht Hermann Göring Field Marshals (Generalfeldmarschall) Heer Werner von Blomberg Fedor von Bock Eduard Freiherr von Böhm-Ermolli (honorary) Walther von Brauchitsch Ernst Busch Wilhelm Keitel Ewald von Kleist Günther von Kluge Georg von Küchler Wilhelm Ritter von Leeb Wilhelm List Erich von Manstein Walter Model Friedrich Paulus Walter von Reichenau Erwin Rommel Gerd von Rundstedt Ferdinand Schörner Maximilian von Weichs Erwin von Witzleben Luftwaffe Robert Ritter von Greim Albert Kesselring Erhard Milch Wolfram von Richthofen Hugo Sperrle Grand Admirals (Großadmiral) Kriegsmarine Karl Dönitz Erich Raeder

• 1935 establishments in Germany
• 1945 disestablishments in Germany
• Disbanded armies
• German Army (1935–1945)
• Military history of Germany during World War II
• Military units and formations established in 1935
• Military units and formations disestablished in 1945